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Abstract 
Demand for lotteries has been estimated in several countries, an important issue being 
whether operators set lottery payouts optimally. The question is tackled by means of a 
traditional demand equation in effective price and recently by a demand equation variant in 
jackpots, both specifications indicating that in many countries operators set their payout 
ratio more or less correctly and slightly on the generous side. The objective of this paper is 
to provide evidence on the lottery demand parameters in Greece and to assess the optimality 
of the current payout-allocating rules. 
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1. Introduction 
Lotto, one of the most popular lotteries, has been actively investigated because it 
introduces a variation in prizes caused either by varying participation or by 
rollovers. Although the price of a bet itself does not vary, effective price, or price 
minus expected payoff, varies considerably because of prize variation. A number of 
studies have investigated whether lottery operators correctly price their product, in 
the sense of setting revenue maximizing payout ratios in line with the inverse 
elasticity rule (Cook and Clotfelter, 1993; Farrell et al., 1999; Forrest et al., 2002; 
Gulley and Scott, 1993; Mason et al., 1997). It must be noted that in the present 
context “pricing” refers to effective rather than face ticket prices and that assessment 
of current “pricing” refers to the payout component of the effective price. 
In standard analysis, payout rules are correctly set in a lottery if its effective 
price elasticity is equal to unity in absolute value, implying that the operator’s net 
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revenue is maximized. Recently, however, Forrest et al. (2002) analyzed the issue of 
optimality directly by focusing on the jackpot elasticity of demand. Their approach 
has still a straightforward implication for optimal parameter setting in the sense that 
if the jackpot elasticity of demand is equal to the payout ratio, then net revenue is 
maximized. Optimality can therefore be attained by adjusting the payout ratio to the 
elasticity of demand. 
This paper analyzes payout-allocating rules in the Greek lottery and assesses 
their optimality. Demand equations both in effective price and jackpot are estimated, 
and corresponding point elasticities are calculated on the basis of the time series of 
JOKER, a lotto game recently introduced in Greece. Elasticities are then used to 
assess the payout-allocating rules set by the local operator. The evidence presented 
in this paper suggests that the local operator has set a payout ratio lower than what 
would have been optimal given the lottery demand parameters in Greece. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The lottery is described in Section 
2, methodology and results are presented and discussed in Section 3, and 
conclusions are drawn in the final section. 
2. The Game 
JOKER was launched in November 1997. The game consisted in selecting 5 
numbers out of 45 plus one bonus number out of 20, and the odds of winning the 
jackpot were 24,435,180 to one. There were eight prize categories, the jackpot for 
those having predicted the correct 5+1 numbers drawn, and seven lesser categories 
for 5, 4+1, 4, 3+1, 3, 2+1, and 1+1 correct numbers. The overall payout ratio was set 
to 50% of sales with 20% to the jackpot, 9% to the second prize, and 21% to the 
other prizes. A minimum jackpot was guaranteed. There were two draws per week 
from the start, undistributed prizes were rolled over to the next draw, and a bet’s 
price was set equal to $0.42 (€0.29) (for a US/€ rate of 1.4609 on Jan. 18, 2008). 
The JOKER was an exceptional success. Sales in 1998, its first full year of 
existence, exceeded $438,270 million (€300 million), and success continued in 
subsequent years; see Figure 1. 
3. Demand Estimation 
Empirical analysis is based on the estimation of the demand parameters and the 
point elasticity of demand. The corresponding demand equations with respect to 
effective price and jackpot are: 
2 2
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Figure 1. Annual JOKER Sales 
for the effective price model specification and: 
2 2
0 1 1 2 3 4 5 6lnJ S R R T T Dγ γ γ γ γ γ γ ν−= + + + + + + +   
2
0 1 1 2 3 4 5
ˆln lnS S J T T D uδ δ δ δ δ δ−= + + + + + +  (2) 
for the jackpot model specification where: 
Q  ( S≠ ) is bets (not equal to sales because of a non-unitary price) 
1Q−  ( 1S−  ) is lagged bets (sales) 
P    is the effective price 
J    is the jackpot 
T    is the trend 
D    is a superdraw dummy 
u  and ν   are error terms 
R    is the jackpot rolled over from the previous draw 
and hats denote fitted values. Sales were substituted for bets because lotto in Greece 
did not have a unit price, and estimation was performed with two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) because bets (sales) and effective prices or jackpots are simultaneously 
determined. Squares of rollover and trend were included to capture potential 
nonlinear effects. 
The effective price, P , of a bet was calculated using the standard formula: 
(expected prize) (expected share)P C= − × , (3) 
where C  is the face value of a bet. Assuming that lottery tickets are submitted 
randomly and independently, the number of winning bets is well approximated by 
the Poisson distribution, and expected share is given by pQe pQ )1( −−  (Cook and 
Clotfelter, 1993, p. 636). On the other hand, expected prize is equal to the current 
draw’s jackpot, J , plus any rollover, R , from previous draws times the probability, 
p , of a bet winning the first prize, so that: 
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1 ( )(1 )( )
pQ pQe R J eP C p R J C
pQ Q
− −− + −
= − + = − . (4) 
Point elasticity estimates corresponding to specifications (1) and (2) are given by 
2
ˆ Pβ  and 2ˆ Jδ , where bars denote sample averages, and optimality of the payout 
parameter decision is inferred by testing the null hypotheses 0 2ˆ: 1H Pβ = −  and 
0 2
ˆ:H J jδ = , where j  is the payout ratio for the first category prize. 
Data on JOKER sales, prizes, and number of winning tickets per draw were 
collected from the operator’s website (www.opap.gr) and cover the period from July 
1999 to December 2003. Results are reported in Table 1.  
Table 1. JOKER Demand Equation 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
Constant 13.879 (16.204)** 11.994 (23.055)** 
Lagged Bets 0.237 (4.401)** ― 
Lagged Sales ― 0.162 (4.542)** 
Trend −2.073 × 10−4 (0.618) −3.395 × 10−4 (1.182) 
Square Trend −7.836 × 10−7 (1.074) −4.191 × 10−7 (0.663) 
Price −7.185 (13.644)** ― 
Jackpot ― 2.072 × 10−7 (17.911)** 
Superdraw −0.453 (1.816) −0.364 (1.692) 
Short-run elasticity [99% CI] −1.729 [−2.055, −1.402] 0.305 [0.261, 0.349] 
Adjusted R2 0.63 0.73 
Durbin h 1.97 1.95 
Sample size 467 467 
Notes: Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses. ** and * denote significance at 1% and 5% levels. 
Inspection of Table 1 indicates that JOKER was designed in a rather 
parsimonious way, and payouts were set lower than what would have been justified 
by net revenue maximization. The effective price elasticity estimate from model (1) 
is −1.73, which is significantly greater than unity in absolute value at the actual 
payout of the game, and the jackpot elasticity estimate from model (2) is 
approximately 30%. Superdraws seem not to have elicited significant response as 
compared to rollovers, lagged bets and sales; the superdraw dummy coefficient is 
not significant in either model at standard significance levels. Finally, the trend and 
square trend coefficients appear to be insignificant. 
We find that price elasticity was extremely high in Greece as compared to other 
lotteries. For instance, Gulley and Scott (1993) reported price elasticities of −1.15, 
−1.92, and −1.20 for the Massachusetts, Kentucky, and Ohio lotteries, Farrell et al. 
(1999) found a short-run price elasticity of −1.05 for the UK National Lottery, 
whereas Forrest et al. (2002) estimated a short run elasticity of −0.82 and −0.84 on a 
more recent set of data for midweek and weekend draws of the British lottery. 
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Although price sensitivity is measured in response to transitory effective price 
changes (caused by rollovers as well as superdraws), one would be inclined to 
expect that a more generous design in terms of payouts would be advisable. 
4. Conclusions 
Lottery demand elasticity in Greece appears to be much higher than its revenue 
maximizing value. Our findings suggest that the game is “overpriced” as compared 
to lotteries in other countries in the sense that the payout is set too low by the Greek 
provider. In our opinion and in view of our estimates, the Greek provider should 
consider a more generous payout in order to stimulate greater lottery revenues. 
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